Out of the Quandary: Personal Jurisdiction Over Absent Class Member Claims Explained by Spencer, A. Benjamin
William & Mary Law School 
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 
Fall 2019 
Out of the Quandary: Personal Jurisdiction Over Absent Class 
Member Claims Explained 
A. Benjamin Spencer 
spencer@wm.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Fourteenth 
Amendment Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Repository Citation 
Spencer, A. Benjamin, "Out of the Quandary: Personal Jurisdiction Over Absent Class Member Claims 
Explained" (2019). Faculty Publications. 1962. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1962 
Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs 
Out of the Quandary: Personal Jurisdiction Over 
Absent Class Member Claims Explained 
A. Benjamin Spencert 
ABSTRACT 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, litigants 
and lower courts have wrestled with the issue of whether a federal 
court must be able to exercise personal jurisdiction with respect to 
each of the claims asserted by absent class members in a class action 
and, if so, what standard governs that jurisdictional determination. 
This issue is rapidly coming to a head and is poised for inevitable 
resolution by the Supreme Court in the near future; multiple circuit 
courts have heard appeals from district courts that have reached 
varying conclusions on this point. 
To provide guidance, both to the circuit courts facing this issue 
as well as to the Supreme Court once it is squarely presented with the 
question, this Article provides the proper analysis that courts should 
employ concerning the ability of federal courts to adjudicate the 
claims of absent class members. To wit: A federal court's authority to 
render a binding judgment against a defendant is currently 
constrained-by rule-to be coterminous with that of the courts of 
general jurisdiction in the fora in which they are located. Such 
constraints-which emanate from the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment-mandate that the claims of absent members 
of a certified class must either arise out of or be related to the 
defendant's contacts with the forum, or be brought in a forum in which 
the defendant could be subjected to general jurisdiction. Prior to class 
certification, the claims of absent class members are not properly 
before the court and thus are not subject to dismissal; however, in 
anticipation of the requirement that only those class members whose 
claims can satisfy applicable Fourteenth Amendment standards may 
properly be included within the definition of the class that is certified, 
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a district court may strike from the complaint the allegations 
pertaining to the claims of absent class members who will be unable 
to meet these standards in response to a motion to strike. Or, as an 
alternative to that approach, defendants may opt to urge the district 
court to limit the definition of the certified class to the claims of 
absentees that meet Fourteenth Amendment constraints. To the extent 
the court certifies a class that includes the claims of absent class 
members that do not meet these constraints, the defendant may appeal 
the certification decision on that ground. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 
San Francisco County, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a California 
state court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant based on the claims of non-California residents that did not 
arise out of and were not related to the California contacts of that 
defendant. 1 Because Bristol-Myers involved a nationwide mass action 
directly filed in a California state court by the non-residents 
themselves, the Court's decision did not touch on the question of 
I. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) ("In order for a court to exercise specific 
jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an 'affiliation between the forum and the 
underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place 
in the forum State."' (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915,919 (2011))) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
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whether state-court limits on personal jurisdiction applied to the 
claims of unnamed class members not injured in the forum, 2 nor did 
its decision address whether the Fifth Amendment imposed similar 
restrictions on federal courts. 3 
The lower courts have quickly confronted the issues left open 
in Bristol-Myers, reaching varying results. Molock v. Whole Foods 
Market Group, Inc. , is a putative class action filed in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia by past and present employees 
seeking wages they claimed were owed to them but not paid.4 Named 
class representatives included employees whose claims were not based 
on any conduct occurring within the District of Columbia, and the 
proposed class included persons whose claims had no connection with 
the forum. The district court dismissed the claims of the class 
representatives whose claims were not connected to D.C., but declined 
to exclude the unnamed putative class members whose claims were 
not connected to D.C., stating, "the court joins the other courts that 
have concluded that Bristol-Myers does not require a court to assess 
personal jurisdiction with regard to all non-resident putative class 
members."5 On September 25, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit heard argument in the appeal of the district court's 
decision in the case. 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has 
reached a contrary result. In Mussat v. IQVIA Inc., the plaintiff (an 
Illinois citizen) sued the defendant (a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Pennsylvania) in Illinois federal court 
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCP A), seeking to 
represent a geographically unrestricted, putative class of individuals 
with similar claims.6 The district court granted the defendant's motion 
to strike the claims of the non-Illinois absent class members from the 
definition of the class on the ground that applicable Fourteenth 
Amendment due process limitations "require[] a connection between 
the forum and the specific claims at issue" and "bars nationwide class 
2. Id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("The Court today does not 
confront the question whether its opinion here would also apply to a class action in 
which a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class of 
plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there."). 
3. Id. at 1783-84 ("In addition, since our decision concerns the due process 
limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question 
whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction by a federal court."). 
4. 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120--21 (D.D.C. 2018). 
5. Id. at 127. 
6. No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at *l (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018). 
34 THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 39:1 
actions in fora where the defendant is not subject to general 
jurisdiction."7 On September 27, 2019, the Seventh Circuit heard 
argument in the appeal of the district court's decision in the case. 8 
Given the importance of the class action device and the need 
for courts to know whether plaintiffs may bring nationwide class 
actions in a given jurisdiction, it is critical to resolve the question of 
whether federal courts9 may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
defendants with respect to the claims of unnamed class members 10 
whose claims are unconnected with the forum. In what follows, this 
Article will supply the doctrinal analysis that answers this question 
and provide guidance to courts regarding how they should proceed 
when such questions arise. 
7. Id. at *5 (citing Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780-81). 
8. An additional case is headed for appellate review in the Fifth Circuit-an 
appeal of the decision in Cruson v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 4:16-CV-00912, 
2018 WL 2937471, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Tex. June 12, 2018), in which the district court 
held that the defendant waived its personal jurisdiction challenge with respect to the 
claims of unnamed class members by not raising that objection until the class 
certification stage. Because of the court's waiver decision, the defendant's 
arguments under Bristol-Myers were not considered, and thus, the question 
addressed by this Article-the applicability of that case to class actions-may not 
be addressed by the circuit court. 
9. This Article will confine itself to a discussion of the authority of federal 
courts to render binding judgments respecting the claims of absent class members, 
because it is in that context that the question most immediately presents itself in the 
cases mentioned, which are those most likely to immanently reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court. However, it is highly likely that the ability of state courts to render binding 
judgments over such claims will be constrained to a similar-if not greater--extent. 
10. This Article need not thoroughly examine the question of whether a court 
must have personal jurisdiction over the claims of named class members and, if so, 
what standard should be applied. That question is manifestly resolved with reference 
to Bristol-Myers. Named plaintiffs must assert claims that have a connection with 
the forum to comport with due process. This is, in effect, the judgment reached by 
the district court in Molock. 297 F. Supp. 3d at 126 ("Here, fairness to Defendants 
counsels against exercising personal jurisdiction over the claims of [named class 
representatives], which simply have nothing to do with this forum. Accordingly, the 
claims of [ named class representatives] against Defendants are dismissed for lack of 
specific personal jurisdiction."). See also Spratley v. FCA US LLC, 3: l 7-CV-0062, 
2017 WL 4023348, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) ("[I]n this case, the out-of-state 
[named] Plaintiffs have shown no connection between their claims and Chrysler's 
contacts with New York. Therefore, the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over the 
out-of-state Plaintiffs' claims."). Cf. Roy v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 353 
F. Supp. 3d 43, 56 (D. Mass. 2018) ("[T]his court ultimately does not find persuasive 
Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish this case from Bristol-Myers on the basis that it is 
an FLSA collective action in federal court."). 
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I. THE JURIDICAL STATUS OF UNNAMED CLASS 
MEMBERS AND THEIR CLAIMS IN A PUTATIVE CLASS 
ACTION 
35 
The starting point in this analysis is to specify the status of the 
absent members of a putative class and their claims. This is a vital first 
step because when a complaint is initially filed by a class 
representative on behalf of a class, whether the court may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the claims of absent class members against 
the defendant depends on whether the absent class members and their 
claims are considered to be before that court. This issue has been 
articulated-unfortunately in my view-as turning on whether absent 
class members are considered "parties" in the action. In Devlin v. 
Scardel/etti, the Supreme Court stated that "[n]onnamed class 
members, however, may be parties for some purposes and not for 
others. The label 'party' does not indicate an absolute characteristic, 
but rather a conclusion about the applicability of various procedural 
rules that may differ based on context." 11 In what contexts has the 
Court engaged in this analysis and what can that tell us about absent 
class members' status for purposes of personal jurisdiction? 
In the context of the diversity jurisdiction analysis for class 
actions, the Supreme Court has embraced seemingly divergent 
approaches. With respect to determining the amount in controversy in 
a class action, the Court has held that the claim of each class 
member-whether named or unnamed-must satisfy the amount-in­
controversy requirement of the diversity statute-28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a). 12 Further, the Court has held that where one class member's 
claim satisfies that requirement, the insufficient claims of other class 
members may not be aggregated to the sufficient claim to reach the 
jurisdictional amount. 13 However, when assessing diversity of 
citizenship for class actions, the Court has indicated that the 
citizenship of only the named class representatives is to be taken into 
11. 536 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2002). 
12. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) ("When two or more plaintiffs, 
having separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single 
suit, it is essential that the demand of each be  of the requisite jurisdictional amount." 
(quoting Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead& Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911))). 
13. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291,301 (1973) ("Each p laintiff in a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who 
does not must be dismissed from the case-'one plaintiff may not ride in on 
another's coattails."' (quoting Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 
1972))). 
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account. 14 These varying treatments of absent class members and their 
claims have been regarded--even by the Supreme Court itself-as 
supportive of the notion that absent class members "may be parties for 
some purposes and not for others." 15 Not so. 
Careful analysis of the reasoning underlying these divergent 
approaches to assessing the twin components of the diversity 
jurisdiction statute reveals that the Supreme Court is not-in either 
case-treating unnamed class members as parties joined in the action. 
The diversity of citizenship rule for class actions-which is articulated 
principally in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble-was an 
application of the then-extant doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction; having 
attained jurisdiction over the claim of a diverse class representative 
against a defendant, a district court could exercise ancillary 
jurisdiction over the claims of members of the class who were not 
diverse from the defendant. 16 Turning to the amount-in-controversy 
requirement for class actions, the rule against aggregating class 
claims-announced in Snyder v. Harris--did not depend on the 
conclusion that the absent class members were parties joined in the 
action and thus their claims had to be assessed under existing non­
aggregation rules. Rather, the Court indicated that once there is a 
judgment for the entire class, the claims of absent class members will 
be included in that judgment, which will mean that the "matter in 
controversy" under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) "now encompasses all the 
claims of the entire class," not just those of the named class 
representative. 17 The Court then concluded that, although "it was in 
14. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1921). See 
also Snyder, 394 U.S. at 340 ("Under current doctrine, if one member of a class is 
of diverse citizenship from the class' opponent, and no nondiverse members are 
named parties, the suit may be brought in federal court even though all other 
members of the class are citizens of the same State as the defendant and have nothing 
to fear from trying the lawsuit in the courts of their own State."). 
15. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10. 
16. 255 U.S. at 365 ("The right of the court to proceed to decree between the 
appellants and the new parties [non-diverse unnamed class members] did not depend 
upon difference of citizenship; because, the bill having been filed by the original 
complainants on behalf of themselves and all other creditors choosing to come in 
and share the expenses of the litigation, the court, in exercising jurisdiction between 
the parties, could incidentally decree in favor of all other creditors coming in under 
the bill. Such a proceeding would be ancillary to the jurisdiction acquired between 
the original parties, and it would be merely a matter of form whether the new parties 
should come in as co-complainants, or before a master, under a decree ordering a 
reference to prove the claims of all persons entitled to the benefit of the decree." 
(quoting Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885))). 
17. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 337. 
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joinder cases of this very kind that the doctrine that distinct claims 
could not be aggregated was originally enunciated," there was 
"certainly no reason to treat [class actions] differently from joined 
actions for purposes of aggregation." 18 
Thus, with respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court has 
treated the claims of absent putative class members as follows: 
( 1 }_ There is ancillary jurisdiction over the claims of nondiverse absent 
class members; and (2) the claims of class members to be included in 
the judgment form part of the "matter in controversy" for purposes of 
an analysis under § 1 332, requiring that each independently meet the 
required amount in controversy. Congress disrupted this state of 
affairs to some extent, of course, when it enacted the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute-28 U.S.C. § 1 367. That statute embraced the idea 
that there could be ancillary (now "supplemental") jurisdiction over 
the claims of nondiverse class members but rejected the limitation 
imposed by Snyder on the claims of class members not satisfying the 
amount-in-controversy requirement of the diversity statute. Now, 
supplemental jurisdiction is available for such claims. 1 9  
In Devlin v .  Scardelletti, the Court faced the question of 
whether unnamed class members could appeal the approval of a class 
settlement, given that they were not class representatives and had not 
intervened in the suit. The Court concluded: 
[N]onnamed class members are parties to the 
proceedings in the sense of being bound by the 
settlement. It is this feature of class action litigation 
that requires that class members be allowed to appeal 
the approval of a settlement when they have objected 
at the fairness hearing. To hold otherwise would 
deprive nonnamed class members of the power to 
preserve their own interests in a settlement that will 
ultimately bind them, despite their expressed 
objections before the trial court.20 
18. Id. 
19. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 560 (2005) 
(''Nothing in the text of § 1367(b), however, withholds supplemental jurisdiction 
over the claims of plaintiffs . . .  certified as class-action members pursuant to Rule 
23 . . . . The natural, indeed the necessary, inference is that § 1367 confers 
supplemental jurisdiction over claims by . . .  Rule 23 plaintiffs."). 
20. 536 U.S. at 10. 
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But this was a limited holding recognizing the standing of absent class 
members to challenge a settlement that would bind them as members 
of the class and represent a final decision on their claims. The Court 
did not thereby convert absent class members into named parties in the 
litigation; rather, it indicated that "[ w ]e have never . . .  restricted the 
right to appeal to named parties to the litigation," and concluded that 
unnamed class members do not have to be named parties in the action 
to have the ability to appeal a final determination of their rights. 2 1  
Devlin should not be read as  an example of treating absent class 
members as parties to the action or the litigation, but as the Court 
extending to those members a right to appeal the approval of 
settlements that will bind them. 22 
How do these cases and other Supreme Court precedent inform 
our understanding of the status of unnamed class members in the 
personal jurisdiction context? No Supreme Court case regards absent 
class members as parties joined in the action filed by a putative class 
representative.23 Indeed, "until certification there is no class action but 
merely the prospect of one."24 This means that at the point of filing, 
the action stands as one between the named class representatives and 
the defendant named in the complaint; the claims of absent class 
members are not yet before the court. It necessarily follows that when 
detennining whether there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
with respect to claims asserted by the named plaintiffs in a putative 
class action, the only claims to be assessed by the court are those of 
the class representatives. And that assessment is  to be done in the 
21 .  Id. at 7. 
22. This is not to say that the Devlin majority was correct in extending the right 
of appeals to absent class members. The majority makes a sound policy argument 
that given the inability to opt out of the settlement in what was a class action under 
Rule 23(b)(l ), a right of appeal was the only means an unnamed class member had 
to protect himself from being bound. Id. at 10. However, Justice Scalia, writing in 
dissent, makes a compelling argument that absent class members may simply 
intervene in the action to become parties and assert their right to appeal. Id. at 22-
23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
23. See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) ("A 
federal class action is no longer 'an invitation to joinder' but a truly representative 
suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious 
papers and motions."). See also FED. R. CN. P. 23(a)(l) (permitting a class action 
"only if the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable") 
( emphasis added). 
24. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 72 1 F.3d 95, 1 12 n.22 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (quoting Morlan v. Universal Guar. Life Ins. Co., 298 F.3d 609, 616 (7th 
Cir. 2002)). 
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ordinary case under the auspices of Rule 4(k)( l )(A), 25 which requires 
that the federal district courts respect the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process limitations imposed on the territorial reach of their respective 
host states. 26 
IL DETERMINING A COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER THE 
CLAIMS OF ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS UPON CLASS 
CERTIFICATION 
Once a class is certified, the district court assumes-under 
Rule 23-the ability to render a binding judgment with respect to all 
members of that class as the court has defined it-named and 
unnamed. This comports with the due process rights of the unnamed 
class members because they are afforded notice of the action and the 
ability to opt out of the class. 27 The question is whether the defendant 
retains any due process protections that are triggered by the 
certification decision with respect to the claims of unnamed class 
members. In other words, once the claims of absent class members 
are certified and are now before the court for its authoritative 
judgment, must that court be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant for each of those claims? 
Certainly, there is nothing more fundamental to judicial 
authority than the principle that a court must have jurisdiction over a 
defendant ( and the subject matter of the dispute) to render a binding 
judgment against it.28 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme 
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(l)(A); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 
(2014) ("Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their 
jurisdiction over persons.") (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(l )(A)). 
26. When the host jurisdiction is the District of Columbia, that concerns 
jurisdiction in a federal enclave through courts whose actions are constrained by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, the long-arm statute of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code § 13-423, 
limits personal jurisdiction against non-residents based on claims arising out of 
contacts with the District of Columbia, consistent with the constitutional limitations 
imposed by the Fifth Amendment. Jackson v. George, 146 A.3d 405, 413 (D.C. 
2016) ("This court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the transacting business provision 
of the District's Long Arm Statute is coextensive with the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. In other words, the defendant must have minimum contacts with 
the forum so that exercising personal jurisdiction over it would not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.") ( emphasis added) ( citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
27. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
28. Pen.noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) ("Since the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments 
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Court indicated that a court adjudicating the claims of absent class 
members has to have jurisdiction over those claims and that such 
jurisdiction is constrained by due process. The issue the Shutts Court 
faced was the nature of these due process constraints vis-a-vis 
unnamed class members, not whether any due process constraints 
existed at all. Thus, as to the foundational question of whether due 
process supplies any limit on the ability of a court to render a binding 
judgment with respect to absent class members or defendants who face 
the claims of absent class members, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that the answer is yes: "The Fourteenth Amendment does protect 
'persons,' not 'defendants,' however, so absent plaintiffs as well as 
absent defendants are entitled to some protection from the jurisdiction 
of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their claims. "29 
The more challenging questions are what is the specific source 
and content of this protection that the Court has recognized? 
Beginning with the source question first, because we are concerned 
here with the jurisdictional reach of federal courts adjudicating class 
actions, the only possibilities are (1) Rule 4(k)(l )(A) and the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or (2) Rule 23 and the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
A. Rule 4(k)(J)(A) 
Rule 4(k)(l)(A) would appear to have the strongest claim 
because the territorial reach of federal district courts is tied by that 
rule-and, derivatively, by the Fourteenth Amendment-to the reach 
of their respective host states, unless there is an alternate provision of 
Rule 4(k) that applies. 30 Those alternate provisions give a nod to the 
may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground 
that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations 
of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of 
law."). 
29. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811. 
30. Rule 4(k) supplies the applicable rule of personal jurisdiction in all cases 
in federal district court, regardless of whether the court's subject matter jurisdiction 
is based on diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Walden 
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (applying Rule 4(k)(l)(A) to a Bivens action); Omni 
Capital Int"! v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) ("Today, service of 
process in a federal action is covered generally by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure."). None of the analysis of the authority of federal district courts to 
adjudicate the claims of unnamed class members depends on whether those claims 
are based on state or federal law, except to the extent there is a federal law that 
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ability of federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction on a broader 
scale-to the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment-which requires only that a defendant have minimum 
contacts with the United States as a whole.3 1  Thus, a party joined under 
Rule 14  or 19 served within 100 miles of the courthouse where the 
action is pending (and within the United States) is subject to the 
court's jurisdiction, regardless of whether that party has minimum 
contacts with the forum state. 32 When Congress authorizes nationwide 
service of process in a federal statute, Rule 4(k)(l )(C) recognizes that 
jurisdiction can be proper on that basis. 33 And if there is no state with 
which the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to support 
personal jurisdiction in a federal question case, Rule 4(k)(2) permits 
the federal court to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the limits of 
authorizes personal jurisdiction on a nationwide basis. See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 4(k)(l )(C). 
31. See, e.g., Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
("The only difference in the personal-jurisdiction analysis under the two 
Amendments is the scope of relevant contacts: Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which defines the reach of state courts, the relevant contacts are state-specific. Under 
the Fifth Amendment, which defines the reach of federal courts, contacts with the 
United States as a whole are relevant."); see also Republic of Panama v. BCCI 
Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 946--47 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[A] defendant's 
contacts with the forum state play no magical role in the Fifth Amendment analysis 
. . . . Thus, determining whether litigation imposes an undue burden on a litigant 
cannot be determined by evaluating only a defendant's contacts with the forum state. 
A court must therefore examine a defendant's aggregate contacts with the nation as 
a whole rather than his contacts with the forwn state in conducting the Fifth 
Amendment analysis." (footnote omitted)); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers 
v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Constitution 
requires only that the defendant have the requisite 'minimum contacts' with the 
United States, rather than with the particular forum state . . . .  "); United States v. De 
Ortiz, 910 F.2d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1990) (indicating that Fifth Amendment due 
process is satisfied where the defendant has "sufficient contacts with the United 
States as a whole rather than any particular state or other geographic area"). The 
scope of territorial jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment is discussed generally in 
A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71 FLA. L. REV. 979 
(2019). 
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(l )(B). Rule 4(k)(l )(B) limits its reach to service 
"within a judicial district of the United States" because service outside of the United 
States-regardless of whether such service occurred within 100 miles of a federal 
district courthouse-would not be able to establish jurisdiction consistent with the 
limits of the Fifth Amendment, which requires minimum contacts with ( and thus 
service inside of) the United States. 
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(l)(C). 
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the Constitution-which are the Fifth Amendment' s  due process 
constraints. 34 
However, in the class action context, none of the other 
provisions of Rule 4(k) are relevant. The claims of absent class 
members are not before the court at the outset of the action when 
service is made and those members are not joined in the action under 
Rule 14 or 1 9, making Rule 4(k)(l )(B) inapplicable. Neither is there 
a federal statute that authorizes nationwide service of process for class 
actions, making Rule 4(k)(l  )(C) inapplicable. Rule 4(k)(2) 's  provision 
has no relevance to class actions asserting state law claims and is 
ordinarily not available due to the amenability of most defendants to 
specific jurisdiction in a particular U.S. state. It would seem, then, that 
Rule 4(k) ( l )(A) remains the virtually only rule setting forth the 
jurisdictional reach of a district court presented with a class action. 
It is certainly true that Rule 4(k)(l)(A) is the relevant rule 
governing the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant for 
the claims of named class representatives, as those are the claims 
included in the complaint that is served with the summons on the 
defendant. At that time, the claims of unnamed class members-as 
discussed above-are not before the court. Once the court certifies a 
class that includes the claims of absent class members, however, that 
is  when the due process constraints on a court's authority over 
unnamed class members and their claims against the defendant come 
into play.35 But practice under Rule 23 does not require that the 
summons and complaint be re-served on the defendant once a class is 
certified. Does this mean that there is technically no vehicle through 
which Rule 4(k)( l )(A) may be reapplied to govern the territorial reach 
of the court over the claims of absent class members now subject to its 
judgment? 
The Appellees in Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. v. Molock 
certainly thought so, making this argument both in their brief and at 
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
35. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) ("The 
Fourteenth Amendment does protect 'persons,' not 'defendants,' however, so absent 
plaintiffs as well as absent defendants are entitled to some protection from the 
jurisdiction of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their claims."). See also 
William Rubenstein, 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 6:26 (5th ed.) ("If the class 
prevails in the case, the goal is a binding judgment over the defendant as to the 
claims of the entire nationwide class-and the deprivation of the defendant's 
property accordingly. Such a proposed class-wide deprivation triggers a defendant's 
right to class-wide due process, that is, its right to ensure the requisite territorial 
connection between it and the court as to the full scope of its liability."). 
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oral argument before the D.C. Circuit.36 But this is pure nonsense. 
Once a defendant has appeared in a case in response to the original 
service of the complaint, all subsequent pleadings are served on the 
defendant under Rule 5 (a)(l ).37 This means, for example, that an 
amended pleading asserting new claims need not be re-served under 
Rule 4.38 There is no question that-notwithstanding that such 
amended complaints are not served with a summons under Rule 4-
new claims appearing in amended complaints must satisfy the 
jurisdictional constraints imposed by Rule 4(k); courts regularly apply 
Rule 4(k)(l)(A) limitations to the claims appearing in amended 
complaints. 39 It would be preposterous to suggest that because 
amended complaints are served under Rule 5 they may evade the 
restrictions applicable to claims contained within complaints served 
under Rule 4, subject only to the limits of the Fifth Amendment's due 
process clause. Were such the case, the ability to amend would 
provide a gaping loophole to the ordinary territorial restrictions on 
federal court jurisdiction that Rule 4(k) imposes. 
Counsel for the Appellee in Mussat v. IQ VIA Inc. attempted to 
make this point at oral argument before the Seventh Circuit, but was 
rebuffed by the judges of the panel, who argued that Rule 4(k)(l )(A) 
was applicable to claims added by amendment because the original 
named plaintiff-who served the summons and complaint under Rule 
4-was the party asserting the new claims. 40 What should have been 
pointed out to the panel is that when a plaintiff amends its complaint 
to add new plaintiffs under Rule 20, or when new plaintiffs intervene 
in an action under Rule 24, neither of these parties is required to serve 
36. Corrected Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 33 n.9, Whole Foods 11kt. Grp., 
Inc. v. Molock (No. 18-7162), (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2019) ("Service of process on the 
defendant by unnamed class members has never been required under Rule 4, Rule 
23, or any other law. Rule 4 therefore does not limit federal courts' jurisdiction over 
unnamed class members' claims."). 
37. FED. R. Crv. P. 5(a)( l )(B) (providing for service of "a pleading filed after 
the original complaint" in accordance with the various methods identified in Rule 
5(b )). 
38. See, e.g. , Emp. Painters' Tr. v. Ethan Enters., Inc., 480 F.3d 993, 999 (9th 
Cir. 2007) ("Although the parties and the district court assumed- for reasons not 
explained-that Rule 4 governed service of the amended complaint, that is not so. 
Instead, it is Rule 5 that was applicable."). 
39. See, e.g. , Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700-01 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(applying Rule 4(k)(l)(A) to determine the ability of the district court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over claims asserted in a "Sixth Amended Complaint"). 
40. Oral Argument at 27:53-28:00, Mussat v. IQVIA Inc. (7th Cir. Sept. 27, 
2019) (No. 19-1204), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2019/pr.19-1204.19-
l204_09 _27_2019.mp3. 
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process on the defendant under Rule 4. Instead, their claims are 
introduced in the action either through an amendment under Rule 1 5  
(adding a plaintiff under Rule 20) or a motion to intervene under Rule 
24, both of which are communicated to the defendant under the 
auspices of Rule 5,41  not Rule 4.42 Notwithstanding that, the personal 
jurisdiction limitations of the district court that are imposed by Rule 
4(k) remain the operative constraints that district courts apply to these 
new claims by newly joined parties. It thus cannot be gainsaid that the 
territorial reach of federal courts over claims added to the action after 
the initial service of the summons is defined by Rule 4(k), even though 
none of those claims are served on defendants under Rule 4. It follows, 
then, that if there is any regulatory source of the territorial limits on a 
federal district court's authority to adjudicate the claims of absent 
members of a certified class in a way that binds defendants, it must 
emanate from Rule 4(k). 
B. Rule 23 and the Fifth Amendment 
Indeed, no other plausible candidate for the source of such 
jurisdictional constraints can be found. It cannot be that Rule 23 itself 
provides the relevant jurisdictional rule. Nothing in the language of 
the rule addresses the personal jurisdiction of district courts over the 
claims of absent class members included in a certified class. As a rule 
of procedure promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act (REA), 43 
41. FED. R. Crv. P. 5 (indicating that "a pleading filed after the original 
complaint" may be served by any of the methods enumerated in Rule 5(b); FED. R. 
Crv. P. 24(c) ("A motion to intervene must be served 
on the parties as provided in Rule 5."). See also, e.g. , Bonita Packing Co. v. 
O'Sullivan, 165 F.R.D. 610, 612-13 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("A federal court does not 
have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served properly . . .  
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 . . . .  A summons and complaint in intervention, however, may 
be served in accordance with Rule 5(b) . . . .  "). Rule 24(c) has abrogated the 
understanding that the Supreme Court had prior to the enactment of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that intervening plaintiffs must serve their claims on 
defendants in accord with ordinary requirements of service of process. See In re 
Ind. Transp. Co., 244 U.S. 456, 458 (1917) (Holmes, J.) ("The new claimants are 
strangers and must begin their action by service just as if no one had sued the 
defendant before."). 
42. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., No. 05-2093-JWL-DJW, 
2006 WL 8429267, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 3, 2006) ("[T]he Court finds joinder of the 
proposed plaintiffs under Rule 20(a) is appropriate; thus, Plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend Complaint is granted. Plaintiff shall electronically file and serve the First 
Amended Complaint . . . .  ") (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
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Rule 23 is a procedural device that merely "allows willing plaintiffs to 
join their separate claims against the same defendants in a class action 
. . . .  [L]ike traditional joinder, it leaves the parties' legal rights and 
duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged. "44 
Additionally, because Rule 4(k) expressly addresses the 
territorial reach of federal courts, there is no warrant for federal courts 
to read into Rule 23 a federal common law rule permitting a kind of 
pendent party personal jurisdiction45-limited only by the national 
contacts constraints imposed by the Fifth Amendment46-over the 
claims of unnamed class members to effectuate the purposes of Rule 
23. Although, in another context, the Court has read into Rule 23 the 
ability to toll the running of applicable limitations periods for absent 
class members subsequently choosing to pursue their claims 
individually,47 this was an articulation of an equitable tolling rule in 
the absence of any language in Rule 23 or elsewhere that addressed 
the matter. The authority of federal courts to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over defendants is not an analogous setting. Given the 
provisions addressing jurisdiction in several distinct circumstances in 
Rule 4(k)-none of which explicitly speak of class actions-and the 
failure of Congress to enact a nationwide service-of-process provision 
for class actions, it would be inappropriate for the Court to read Rule 
23 to contain such a provision by implication; expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius. As the Court aptly put it in Omni Capital 
International, Ltd. v. Rudolph Wolff & Co. ,  when confronted with a 
request to imply nationwide jurisdiction into Section 22 of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA): 
Section 22, however, is silent as to service of process. 
This contrasts sharply with the other enforcement 
44. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
408 (2010) (Scalia, J.). See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, 
and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 UCLA L. REV. 654 (2019) (discussing the limits 
imposed on rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act). 
45. The contemporary doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction as embraced 
by the circuit courts is that "where a federal statute authorizes nationwide service of 
process, and the federal and state-law claims derive from a common nucleus of 
operative fact, the district court may assert personal jurisdiction over the parties to 
the related state-law claims even if personal jurisdiction is not otherwise available." 
Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 88 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1056 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
46. See supra note 31 ( citing cases articulating the national contacts standard 
applicable under the Fifth Amendment). 
47. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
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provisions of the CEA, on which Omni asks us to rely. 
We find it significant that Congress expressly provided 
for nationwide service of process in those sections but 
did not do so in the new § 22. It would appear that 
Congress knows how to authorize nationwide service 
of process when it wants to provide for it. That 
Congress failed to do so here argues forcefully that 
such authorization was not its intention. 48 
Further, even if implying a nationwide jurisdictional reach on 
a pendent personal jurisdiction theory were permissible, 49 it could not 
be justified by a need to effectuate the policy behind Rule 23 of 
facilitating class actions. U.S.-based defendants will always be suable 
in their home jurisdictions. 5° Foreign defendants can be sued by 
classes in federal courts located in those states with which they have 
minimum contacts, and then those actions can be subsequently 
consolidated and transferred to a single district under the multidistrict 
litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, if the respective classes raise 
common questions of fact.51 Nationwide jurisdiction in every federal 
48. 484 U.S. 97, 106 (1987). 
49. Note that the Supreme Court expressly rejected the attempt to permit a state 
court to exercise pendent party personal jurisdiction over claims unconnected with 
the forum in Bristol-Myers Squibb: 
As we have explained, "a defendant's relationship with a . . .  third party, standing 
alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction." This remains true even when third 
parties (here, the plaintiffs who reside in California) can bring claims similar to those 
brought by the nonresidents. Nor is it sufficient-or even relevant-that BMS 
conducted research in California on matters unrelated to Plavix. What is needed­
and what is missing here-is a connection between the forum and the specific claims 
at issue. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 
(2017) (citation omitted). 
50. Daimler AG v. Bauman,571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014). 
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) ("When civil actions involving one or more common 
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred 
to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."). Personal 
jurisdiction is not ordinarily a problem for a transferee court receiving actions from 
other federal districts under § 1407 (the MDL statute). See In re FMC Corp. Patent 
Litig., 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976) ("Transfers under Section 1407 are 
simply not encumbered by considerations of in personamjurisdiction and venue . . . .  
Following a transfer, the transferee judge has all the jurisdiction and powers over 
pretrial proceedings in the actions transferred to him that the transferor judge would 
have had in the absence of transfer."). See also Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 
382 F. App'x 437,442 (6th Cir. 2010) ("The MDL statute (28 U.S.C. § 1407) is, in 
fact, legislation 'authorizing the federal courts to exercise nationwide personal 
Fall 2019] OUT OF THE QUANDARY 47 
district is hardly necessary to vindicate the interests of Rule 23. If 
these vehicles for asserting class actions are deemed by Congress to 
be insufficient, it well knows how to remedy the situation through 
legislation52  or a direct revision of the Federal Rules. 53 
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Standard 
Now that we have established that there must be personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to the claims of absent class 
members, and that Rule 4(k) determines the scope of a federal district 
court's jurisdictional reach over such claims, stating the content of the 
standard that courts must use to guide their jurisdictional analysis is 
straightforward. The Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
constraints-made operative in federal court by Rule 4(k)(l)(A)­
"limit[] the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment 
against a nonresident defendant."54 The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
stressed that this limitation means--outside the general jurisdiction 
context-"there must be 'an affiliation between the forum and the 
underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that 
takes place in the forum State"'55 and is therefore subject to the State's 
regulation. More directly, the Court has stated that "[i]n order for a 
state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, 'the suit ' must 'aris[ e] out 
of or relat[ e] to the defendant's contacts with the forum. "'56 
Although the Court has also emphasized that "a variety of 
interests" are relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis-with the 
"primary concern" being "the burden on the defendant"-these 
jurisdiction."') (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 163 
(2d Cir. 1987)). 
52. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (providing for nationwide service of process in 
statutory interpleader actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1335). See also, e.g. ,  15 U.S.C. § 
22 (Clayton Act) ("[A]ll process in such cases may be served in the district of which 
it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found."). 
53. If an alternate jurisdictional rule were desired for class actions, the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee, or Congress, could amend Rule 4(k) by adding the 
following language to what would become Rule 4(k.)(3): 
(3) Claims of Unnamed Class Members. For claims asserted by unnamed members 
of a class action, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant if exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United 
States Constitution and laws. 
54. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v .  Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). 
55. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty. ,  137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1781 (2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915, 919 (2011)). 
56. Id. at 1780 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)). 
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considerations cannot control the analysis because "restrictions on 
personal jurisdiction . . .  'are a consequence of territorial limitations 
on the power of the respective States. "'57 As a result, as stated recently 
by the Court in Bristol-Myers, 
[E]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no 
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the 
tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a 
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; 
even if the forum State is the most convenient location 
for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an 
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act 
to divest the State of its power to render a valid 
judgment. 58  
This understanding has characterized the Court's modern personal 
jurisdiction doctrine from its inception, as it has held that the Due 
Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding 
a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant 
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. "59 
Applying these "settled principles" to the claims of absent, 
unnamed class members leads inevitably to the conclusion that to the 
extent such claims are unconnected with the defendant's forum state 
contacts, contemporary understandings of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's constraints on state power prevent that forum from 
rendering a binding, in personam judgment against the defendant on 
those claims. When there is confessedly no link between the claims of 
nonresident, absent class members and the defendant's  contacts with 
the forum state, that forum may not exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant with respect to those claims based merely on the 
defendant's relationship with third parties whose claims are connected 
with the forum, regardless of how similar those claims are to those 
brought by nonresidents. That, of course, is the core holding of Bristo/­
Myers. Given that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
constraints are the operative limitations on a federal district court's 
5 7. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). 
58. Id. at 1780-81 (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294). It is 
this power component of the due process constraint on a court's territorial authority 
that undermines any attempt to rely on the certification requirements of Rule 23 as 
sufficient to protect the due process rights of defendants. 
59. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
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jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of unnamed class members, the 
Bristol-Myers Court's interpretation thereof and the result it compels 
cannot be circumvented or otherwise avoided. 
III. APPL YING THE CONSTRAINT: HOW COURTS MAY 
ENFORCE THE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR TERRITORIAL 
REACH OVER THE CLAIMS OF ABSENT CLASS 
MEMBERS 
Concluding that a federal court may adjudicate the claims of 
unnamed class members against nonresident defendants only if those 
claims are connected with the defendants'' forum contacts does not 
resolve how this limitation is to be enforced. We return to the 
previously established proposition that at the outset of an action, a 
complaint filed by a plaintiff proposing to proceed on behalf of a 
putative class has not yet brought those claims before the court. This 
means that although the defendant may file a motion under Rule 
12(b)(2) to dismiss the claims of the named class representative for a 
lack of personal jurisdiction if warranted by the facts, 60 the defendant 
may not move to dismiss the claims of absent members of a putative, 
proposed class referenced in the complaint. A corollary of this 
principle is that a defendant's failure to seek the dismissal of the 
claims of absent members of a putative class in conformity with the 
consolidation and forfeiture principles imposed by Rule 12(h)61  will 
not constitute a waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense for those 
claims.62 
Instead, the limits on the court's territorial jurisdiction must be 
factored into the court's determination of the definition of the class it 
will certify under Rule 23.63 In the face of an objection to the court's 
60. See, e.g., Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1 14, 
1 26 (D.D.C. 20 1 8) (granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of 
personal jurisdiction with respect to claims asserted by two named class 
representatives). 
6 1 .  FED. R. CN. P. 12(h)(l )  (providing that personal jurisdiction defenses are 
waived if not raised by motion under Rule 12  or in a responsive pleading filed in the 
absence of any Rule 12 motions). 
62. This conclusion means that the decision of the district court in Cruson v. 
Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 4 : 1 6-CV-00912, 201 8  WL 293747 1 (E.D. Tex. June 
12 ,  201 8)-in which it held that the defendant waived its personal jurisdiction 
challenge by failing to raise the challenge via a motion to dismiss before the class 
certification determination-was in error and should be reversed by the Fifth Circuit. 
63. FED. R. CN. P. 23(c)(l)(B). 
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jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members having claims 
that are unconnected to the forum, the court should engage in the 
jurisdictional analysis called for by Bristol-Myers and exclude from 
the definition of the class those claims that cannot meet that 
constitutional standard. In the absence of such an objection, a court is 
under no obligation to exclude such claims sua sponte because the 
personal jurisdiction objection may be waived. 64 To the extent the 
court-over the defendant's objection-certifies a class that includes 
the claims of absent class members that do not meet the applicable 
Fourteenth Amendment due process constraints, the defendant may 
seek an appeal of the certification decision65 or seek to alter or amend 
the class definition66 on this ground. 
However, a defendant need not await the certification 
determination to raise personal jurisdiction problems for the claims of 
absent class members. Although, as previously indicated, a motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction would be out of order with 
respect to such claims at the outset when only a putative class is being 
proposed, it would very much be in order for a defendant to seek to 
excise allegations from a complaint that purport to include unnamed 
class members having non-forum-connected claims within the 
definition of the class. The mechanism for doing so is the motion to 
strike under Rule 12(f).67 A court may strike from a plaintiff's 
pleading any allegations that are without basis and for which there can 
be no recovery, particularly when retaining the allegations would be 
prejudicial to the defendant. 68 Given that a court will ultimately be 
unable to adjudicate the claims of unnamed class members that are 
unconnected with the forum based on a lack of personal jurisdiction 
(if that deficiency is properly raised by the defendant), retaining those 
64. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) ("[N]either 
personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally preliminary in the sense that 
subject-matter jurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges of the defendant, rather 
than absolute strictures on the court, and both may be waived by the parties."). 
65. FED. R.  Crv. P. 23(f). 
66. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(l )(C). 
67. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(f). 
68. See, e.g.,""; Mussat v. IQVIA Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018) ("Courts will strike pleadings that are insufficient as a 
matter of law, meaning they bear no relation to the controversy or would prejudice 
the movant.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Delta 
Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009) 
("The court may either strike on its own or on a motion by a party and has 
considerable discretion in striking any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or 
scandalous matter."). 
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allegations in the complaint, when they cannot be properly included in 
the definition of the certified class, would be to keep "immaterial" and 
"impertinent" matter in the action. 
This is the very approach taken by the judge in Mussat v. 
IQ VIA Inc. 69-a case recently appealed to the Seventh Circuit. That 
court would be well advised to affirm. Regarding the decision of the 
district court in Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., which 
rejected the jurisdictional challenge to the non-forum-connected 
claims of unnamed class members, the D.C. Circuit could affirm the 
denial of the motion to dismiss-given that it was premature-and 
remand with guidance that the district court may either entertain a 
motion to strike the allegations pertaining to unconnected claims of 
unnamed putative class members or revisit the issue when making the 
class certification and class definition determination. In so doing, the 
D.C. Circuit should announce that the standards of Bristol-Myers must 
be applied to such claims when properly raised on remand. An 
alternate approach if it is seen as futile to remand if these claims will 
face certain death, would be for the D.C. Circuit to construe the 
defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion to strike instead, and hold 
that the motion to strike should be granted based on Bristol-Myers. 
CONCLUSION 
In Bristol-Myers, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the 
question of "whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same 
restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal 
court."70 Although the Fifth Amendment permits federal courts to 
exercise personal jurisdiction on a nationwide basis,7 1  federal courts 
are not able to exercise the jurisdiction that the Fifth Amendment 
would permit when they are operating under Rule 4(k)(l)(A). Until 
either Rule 4(k) or Rule 23 is revised-preferably by Congress-to 
provide for personal jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class 
members not arising out of contacts with the forum, or until Congress 
enacts legislation to the same effect, the due process protections that 
class action defendants enjoy in federal court are those of the 
69. 2018 WL 5311903, at *l . 
70. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1784 (2017). 
71. See Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) ("Congress 
could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States.") See also cases 
cited supra in note 31. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, by operation of Rule 4(k)( l )(A). Those 
protections are those announced in Bristol-Myers.72 
72. The Seventh Circuit panel appeared to find it alarming that this 'newly 
discovered rule' from Bristol-Myers would disrupt what it perceived to be decades 
of settled presumptions regarding jurisdiction over class actions. It is hardly unusual 
for Supreme Court pronouncements to have such an effect. See, e.g. , Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overturning Swift v. Tyson after a more than 100-
year reign); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 
(2011) (limiting general jurisdiction to cases where the defendant may be considered 
"at home" despite decades of circuit precedent permitting general personal 
jurisdiction beyond that context in fora where a defendant's contacts were simply 
"continuous and systematic"). 
